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Mexico is entering a decisive stage in the evolution of its antitrust policy. With the recent reform to the Federal Economic Competition Law, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) will give way to the National Antitrust Commission (CNA), a new institution that will assume an even more central role in market regulation.
This change goes far beyond a simple name modification. It entails adjustments in the governing structure, in the process of appointing commissioners, and in the way the new authority interacts with specialized courts. It also redefines the rules applicable to strategic sectors and introduces new challenges related to merger control, investigations, and corporate compliance programs.
In this context, companies and investors must pay close attention to how the new authority’s criteria and procedures evolve. Legal certainty and clarity in rule enforcement will be key to planning operations, assessing risks, and designing long-term business strategies in Mexico.
Mexico’s modern competition policy began in 1994, with the creation of the Federal Competition Commission (COFECO). Established as a decentralized body under the Ministry of Economy, COFECO emerged during the trade liberalization process spurred by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
With only five commissioners and a nascent regulatory framework, COFECO’s mission was to oversee monopolistic practices and ensure a level playing field among market participants. Despite limited resources and experience, it represented a major step toward institutionalizing competition policy in Mexico.
Two decades later, the 2014 constitutional reform on telecommunications and competition gave rise to COFECE. The change aimed to provide greater autonomy, transparency, and decision-making capacity to the authority. One of the most significant modifications was the expansion of the number of commissioners from five to seven, a measure intended to reduce capture risks and promote broader technical debate.
At the same time, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) was created to oversee the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, which had previously absorbed a substantial portion of the competition authority’s agenda.
With the 2025 reform to the Federal Economic Competition Law, Mexico begins a new phase with the creation of the CNA, which will replace COFECE and take on a broader mandate. The new authority will once again supervise telecommunications and broadcasting, following the dissolution of the IFT, while facing shorter procedural deadlines and a greater workload.
The CNA represents a blend of continuity and redesign. It returns to a five-commissioner model similar to COFECO’s, but in a far more complex environment — characterized by a higher number of notified mergers, reduced thresholds, and heightened expectations from both businesses and investors. At the same time, it incorporates new powers and responsibilities that position it at the center of Mexico’s market oversight framework.
While COFECE operated with seven commissioners to enhance plurality and avoid capture risks, the CNA’s reduced structure demands careful selection of technically qualified profiles and retention of specialized teams to ensure analytical quality.
The new authority is expected to maintain COFECE’s tradition of publishing strategic programs and investigative plans, while advancing toward modern methodologies aligned with the evolution of digital markets, artificial intelligence, and highly regulated sectors. The challenge will be to balance efficiency with technical depth, ensuring consistent and predictable resolutions.
From an institutional perspective, the transition from COFECE to the CNA should not be inherently complex. Mexico already operated for two decades under a five-commissioner structure during the COFECO era, proving the model’s viability. The difference today lies in the greater sophistication of markets, the increased volume of transactions, and broader regulatory challenges.
Therefore, what matters most is not the formal structure but the technical caliber and independence of the appointed commissioners. Their expertise will determine whether the CNA consolidates as a credible authority before both the market and the international community. Appointments driven by political criteria could weaken the institution, whereas the selection of competition law and economics specialists could ensure continuity and institutional stability.
Beyond the composition of the board, the CNA’s strength will depend heavily on the retention of the technical staff that has supported Mexico’s competition policy since COFECO and COFECE. These teams possess accumulated expertise in investigations, litigation before courts, and international cooperation in cross-border cases.
Mid-level officials are deeply familiar with national markets, methodologies for assessing monopolistic practices and mergers, and the judicial criteria that have shaped competition jurisprudence in Mexico. This institutional knowledge has allowed the country to build a solid competition framework aligned with international standards — one that would be difficult to recreate from scratch.
If retained, this personnel will enable the CNA to ensure continuity and respond effectively to new challenges. Conversely, a significant loss of human capital could jeopardize the consistency of decisions and increase legal uncertainty for companies and investors.
Following the IFT’s dissolution, responsibilities for telecommunications and broadcasting will return to the competition authority. This considerably broadens the CNA’s scope, requiring it to address strategic sectors under stricter time constraints and limited resources. The challenge will be to maintain balance: handling telecom and broadcasting matters with technical rigor without neglecting other key markets.
To achieve this, the CNA must strengthen its internal capabilities, as the regulatory complexity of these sectors demands highly specialized expertise and stronger coordination mechanisms.
One of the reform’s most debated aspects is the possibility of electing specialized competition judges through popular vote. While the measure aims to increase judicial legitimacy, it raises concerns of politicization. Competition law is a highly technical field, requiring expertise in economic law, market structure analysis, and quantitative methodologies — elements that cannot easily be translated into campaign narratives.
If specialized courts lose technical rigor, rulings may become inconsistent or influenced by non-economic factors. This would undermine legal certainty, a key determinant for foreign investors considering operations or expansion in Mexico’s strategic sectors.
In this environment, expert legal guidance in competition matters becomes increasingly important. Understanding how courts interpret new legal standards will be essential for businesses seeking to design sound regulatory and litigation strategies.
The return to a five-member board may offer certain benefits to the CNA’s internal dynamics:
However, these advantages must be weighed carefully, as the reduction also introduces risks that could affect the institution’s independence and legitimacy.
These risks are significant, as they may affect the perceived autonomy of the authority and the quality of its decisions.
The central challenge is to strike a balance between operational efficiency and institutional legitimacy. A smaller board can function effectively if composed of highly qualified experts supported by professional teams with proven experience. At the same time, transparency and accountability mechanisms are essential to preserve the CNA’s credibility both domestically and internationally.
A particularly sensitive aspect of the reform is the power granted to Congress, under executive influence, to exclude certain “strategic” activities from the law’s scope. This raises concern that some sectors could fall outside the authority’s scrutiny.
Competition policy depends on clear and universally applicable rules. Exempting specific markets risks creating distortions, whether through lack of oversight or discretionary enforcement. Sectors such as energy, hydrocarbons, or infrastructure could be particularly affected, with significant implications for investment and market dynamics.
The reform also shortens administrative investigation periods by nearly half, seeking to enhance the authority’s responsiveness. In principle, this could lead to greater efficiency and predictability. However, in complex cases requiring in-depth economic and legal analysis, reduced timelines may affect the robustness of resolutions, increasing litigation and uncertainty.
For companies, this means preparing documentation and defenses earlier and more comprehensively, as tighter deadlines could directly influence regulatory strategy.
Another major change is the 17% reduction in merger notification thresholds, which will significantly increase the number of transactions subject to CNA review. While the intent is to broaden oversight, the measure could generate bureaucratic pressure unless simplified or “fast-track” procedures are implemented for transactions posing no competitive risk.
Without such mechanisms, review times may lengthen unnecessarily, affecting both domestic and foreign investors.
The reform also strengthens corporate compliance programs and adjusts the leniency framework for anticompetitive practices. Aligned with international standards, these provisions encourage companies to adopt preventive policies, train personnel, and cooperate with authorities when identifying potential violations.
Enhanced compliance mechanisms offer dual benefits: reducing or eliminating liability in specific cases while improving the authority’s capacity to detect illegal conduct that might otherwise go unnoticed. In an increasingly demanding environment, robust internal compliance systems will be essential to mitigate legal and reputational risks.
With the creation of the CNA, Mexico closes a cycle that began with COFECO in 1994 and opens a new one marked by greater technical and political challenges. The new authority will operate with a smaller board, shorter deadlines, lower thresholds, and the possibility that certain strategic sectors remain outside its supervision.
The success of this transition will depend on multiple factors:
Equally crucial will be maintaining judicial expertise and independence within specialized courts, ensuring that economic analysis prevails over political considerations.
For businesses, passive observation is no longer an option. Understanding how these reforms will reshape market oversight, anticipating their impact on mergers, compliance programs, and enforcement trends, and preparing accordingly will be critical.
Now more than ever, competition policy in Mexico will operate under closer scrutiny. Companies must remain proactive, informed, and strategically prepared to navigate a regulatory environment that blends continuity with unprecedented challenges.
At Mijares, we have a specialized Competition and Antitrust team that advises clients on compliance with antitrust regulations and restrictive trade practices.We ensure that their business activities adhere to competition laws, promoting fair market conditions and helping them prevent potential legal exposure or sanctions.
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