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The reform to the Federal Economic Competition Law, published in the Federal Official Gazette on July 16, 2025, substantially reshaped Mexico’s regulatory framework. It reinforced not only cooperation and enforcement mechanisms, but also the institutional design of competition policy. Among the most relevant changes are the creation of the National Antitrust Commission (CNA) as a decentralized body under the Ministry of Economy, the redesign of the immunity program, the reduction of notification thresholds, the increase in fines and sanctions, and the introduction of certified compliance programs.
The creation of the CNA marks the beginning of a new phase. The CNA will be required to administer a more complex system: shortened procedural timelines, a significant increase in the number of transactions requiring prior authorization (as a result of lower thresholds), and greater demands in terms of corporate governance and compliance. For companies and investors, the new regulatory environment requires immediate adaptation, as the authority’s decisions will directly affect regulatory certainty and the predictability of the legal framework.
In 1994, the Federal Competition Commission (COFECO) was created as a decentralized body of the Ministry of Economy, composed of five commissioners. In 2014, it evolved into the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), becoming a constitutionally autonomous authority with broader powers. Under the 2025 Reform, the institution transitions to the CNA, returning to a five-commissioner structure.
Although the change may appear straightforward, it entails a significant institutional shift: commissioners will now be appointed by the President and ratified by the Senate. Historically, the increase from five to seven commissioners sought to mitigate risks of capture; returning to a smaller structure means each appointment gains greater weight. In this context, the technical independence of nominees will be essential to prevent political considerations from influencing decision-making.
The reform also introduces a constitutional and statutory change: judges of specialized courts will be elected by popular vote. Given that competition law requires specialized knowledge in economics, law, and market dynamics, this model raises concerns about the future consistency and technical soundness of judicial criteria. Preserving the institutional experience accumulated by specialized judges and officials will be essential to avoid setbacks in the quality of rulings.
One of the most debated changes is the possibility for the government, with a congressional majority, to exclude certain “strategic” activities from the application of the law. Although the stated objective is to protect sectors relevant to public policy, this power creates the risk of market distortions by imposing asymmetric regulatory burdens between private parties and public-sector entities.
Hypothetical examples illustrate the magnitude of the challenge: excluding sectors such as renewable energy, next-generation telecommunications, or critical infrastructure could disrupt competitive balance, reduce investment incentives, and weaken market confidence. For this reason, the use of this power should be strictly limited and exercised with caution to preserve fair and open competition conditions.
With the dissolution of the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFETEL), telecommunications and broadcasting matters return to the general competition authority. As a result, the CNA will concentrate responsibilities in highly technical sectors, adding this burden to its already demanding merger review agenda, which historically absorbs approximately 90% of its resources.
The risk is clear: with lower thresholds, more merger notifications, and broader investigative powers (including extended timelines for ex officio investigations of non-notified transactions), the authority may be required to allocate limited resources to a larger number of cases. This could dilute its ability to investigate monopolistic practices. The experience of COFECO in 2014—criticized at the time for concentrating its efforts disproportionately on telecommunications—highlights the importance of maintaining institutional balance to avoid neglecting other strategic markets.
Strategic planning is essential to ensure that the CNA maintains a balanced approach. COFECE’s practice of publishing strategic plans to allocate resources and define priorities should not only continue but be strengthened. This tool would allow the authority to investigate markets proactively rather than relying solely on complaints.
A notable shift in institutional planning is the growing interest in labor market dynamics and agreements that may affect them. One example is the increasing scrutiny of no-poach agreements in merger review, whereas COFECE previously analyzed such clauses only when they resembled non-compete obligations (e.g., restrictions on soliciting clients of the target entity).
One of the most controversial changes is the possibility of seeking damages before a final judgment is issued. Although intended to expedite compensation for harm caused by anticompetitive conduct, this measure creates legal uncertainty, as it allows damages to be awarded without a definitive finding of liability. This raises the risk that damages may be ordered based on a competition ruling that is later overturned by a federal court.
Nevertheless, the change presents an opportunity for specialized judges to engage more deeply with substantive competition analysis and strengthen judicial protection of markets. Clear and consistent judicial criteria will be essential to balance procedural efficiency with legal certainty.
The Reform significantly reduces administrative investigation periods. Previously, procedures lasted between two and three years. Under the new rules, the CNA must demonstrate robust organizational capacity to conduct investigations within shorter timelines.
There is a risk that, due to time constraints and a heavy workload, the authority may refrain from opening complex investigations—an outcome that would particularly affect complainants of anticompetitive practices. To mitigate this, reduced timelines must be accompanied by prioritization criteria and procedural tools—such as expedited resolution mechanisms—that allow resources to be concentrated on cases with the greatest structural impact.
The Reform reduces merger notification thresholds by approximately 17%, contrary to the international practice of periodically increasing them. This will expand the range of transactions subject to review, including smaller operations that, while not necessarily representing significant revenue, may involve strategic assets in dynamic markets.
For companies, the challenge will be to prepare more comprehensive filings from the outset. For the CNA, the key will be to distinguish between low-risk transactions suitable for expedited review and those requiring detailed analysis.
The immunity program remains in place but under more stringent rules. Only the first applicant that comes forward before a formal investigation is initiated may obtain full immunity. After the investigation has been opened, applicants may only access partial reductions of up to 50%, 30%, or 20%, depending on timing and the relevance of the information provided.
Complementary benefits are introduced: recipients of immunity will not be barred from participating in public procurement processes and will not be subject to class actions. The aim is to encourage early applications.
The Reform increases the maximum fines: absolute monopolistic practices may reach up to 15% of the offender’s revenues; relative monopolistic practices and unlawful concentrations up to 10%; and failure to obtain prior authorization up to 8%. Additional sanctions were added for procedural noncompliance, such as obstructing inspections or failing to appear, as well as complementary sanctions such as temporary disqualification from public procurement.
Higher fines reinforce the logic of the immunity program: the greater the potential cost of infringing the law, the stronger the incentive to cooperate. However, they may also lead to longer litigation, making it essential for the CNA to apply clear and consistent criteria to prevent market distortions.
The Reform introduces the possibility for companies to implement internal compliance programs certified by the CNA, which must be renewed every three years. If these programs meet standards on prevention, training, and early detection, they may be considered mitigating factors in the event of violations.
Beyond sanctions mitigation, certification signals a genuine commitment to fair competition and can serve as a risk-management tool for investors and strategic partners. In a context of heightened fines, having a certified program becomes an essential preventive measure rather than an optional enhancement.
The Reform redefines the scope of competition policy in Mexico. By strengthening the CNA with new powers, shortening procedural timelines, expanding the range of notifiable transactions, and increasing sanctions, Mexico signals a model of more active state oversight in the markets.
The success of this transformation will depend on the CNA’s ability to provide institutional confidence, apply consistent technical criteria, and balance enforcement with procedural efficiency. For companies and investors, strategic anticipation and robust internal compliance mechanisms will be critical to managing risk.
More than ever, Mexico faces the challenge of building a competition system that combines technical rigor with the flexibility needed to keep pace with evolving digital and global markets.
At Mijares, we have a specialized Competition and Antitrust team that advises clients on compliance with antitrust regulations and restrictive trade practices.We ensure that their business activities adhere to competition laws, promoting fair market conditions and helping them prevent potential legal exposure or sanctions.
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